Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) is a system of predetermined capital/asset ratios that trigger supervisory actions by a banking regulator. Our paper addresses the optimality of this regulation system by adapting a dynamic model of entrepreneurial …nance to banking regulation. In a dynamic moral hazard setting, we …rst derive the optimal contract between the banker and the regulator and then implement it by a menu of regulatory tools. Our main …ndings are the following: …rst, the insurance premium is a risk-based premium where the risk is measured by the capital level; second, our model implies a capital regulation system that shares several similarities with the US PCA. According to our proposed system, regulatory supervision should be realized in the spirit of gradual intervention and the book-value of capital is used as information to trigger intervention. Banks with high capital are not subject to any restrictions. Dividend distribution is prohibited in banks with intermediate level of capital. When banks have low capital level, a plan of recapitalization is required and in the worst case, banks are placed in liquidation.
Introduction
Following the implementation of the …rst Basel Accord (1988), academic research has spent a lot of e¤ort in assessing the e¤ects of minimum capital requirement on excessive
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily re ‡ect those of the Norges Bank. I am very grateful to Jean-Charles Rochet, my thesis advisor, and to Thomas Mariotti, Donato Masciandaro, Rafael Repullo, my thesis committee members, for helpful comments and suggestions. I also bene…t from comments by participants at the 23rd Annual Congress of the European Economic Association in Milan, the Annual Meeting of the Association of Southern European Economic Theorists in Florence, the ADRES Doctoral Conference in Louvain La Neuve, Policy Seminar at Norges Bank. Email: thi-quynh-anh.Vo@norges-bank.no risk taking incentives. A conclusion derived from these works is that imposing minimum regulatory capital requirements itself does not constitute an adequate solution for reducing excessive risk taking, particularly in today's world where …nancial innovation has produced new markets and instruments that make it easy for banks and their employees to make huge bets easily and quickly. This thinking drives the Basel Committee to incorporate in Basel Accord II the pillar 2 -supervisory review -and the pillar 3 -market disciplineas complementary to the pillar 1 -minimum capital requirement. The Basel Committee states that the goal of the pillar 2 is to enable early supervisory intervention if the capital does not provide a su¢ cient bu¤er against risk. However, it remains silent on the way to implement this principle in practice, or in other words, it remains silent on the threshold and forms of intervention.
In the United State (US), a system of predetermined capital/asset ratios that trigger structured actions by supervisor, which is called as Prompt Corrective Action (PCA), was introduced in the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDI-CIA). PCA classi…es banks in …ve categories depending on their capital ratios: well capitalized, adequately capitalized, undercapitalized, signi…cantly undercapitalized and critically undercapitalized. Imposition of regulatory restraints on banks becomes more and more severe the lower their capital ratios. For instance, well capitalized and adequately capitalized banks face no restrictions. Undercapitalized banks don't have right to capital distribution (dividend or stock repurchase). Signi…cantly undercapitalized banks must submit a recapitalization plan. Critically undercapitalized banks have to be placed in receivership within 90 days. Some positive observed e¤ects of FDICIA in creating the appropriate incentives for banks, for deposit insurer and for prudential supervisor result in the increasing number of recommendations to introduce PCA -type provisions in other countries. Over the past years, Japan, Korea and Mexico have adopted a similar system of the US PCA. Recently, the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC) made a proposal aimed at dealing with problem banks. One of the recommendations in their proposal is to implement a PCA regime in each individual Member State. In such circumstances, a rigorous study of the optimality of PCA-type regulation seems timely and relevant. Our paper will address this issue by adapting a standard dynamic model of entrepreneurial …nance to banking regulation. We consider an in…nitely repeated relationship between a banker and a Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC). The banker runs a bank whose cumulative cash ‡ows are assumed to follow an arithmetic Brownian motion process.
The drift of this process depends on the banker's e¤ort which is costly for the banker and unobservable to the DIC. As provider of deposit insurance service, the latter does supervise the former on behalf of depositors. The regulatory rules are speci…ed in the contract to which both parties fully commit ex-ante. We assume that to provide the banker with appropriate incentives, the DIC can control her compensations, require her to inject more capital into the bank or force her to liquidate it. Hence, in our paper, we account for the possibility that the bank is recapitalized during its operation if necessary. The banker has to bear a positive cost for each additional unit of capital injected into the bank. Moreover, there exists some exogenous bound for the amount of capital per unit of time the banker can contribute. This bound may be justi…ed by some exogenous borrowing constraints due to the imperfections of capital market.
In such a framework, to derive insights about an optimal regulation system, this paper proceeds as follows: we …rst characterize the optimal contract between the banker and the DIC. The method we use to solve for the optimal contract is the dynamic programming technique. Speci…cally, we use the banker's continuation utility as a single state variable and the optimal contract will be contingent on it. In continuous-time, the incentive compatibility condition is determined by the volatility of the banker's continuation utility process. The DIC's payo¤ is speci…ed through some ordinary di¤erential equations. After the characterization, we construct a regulatory menu that can implement the optimal contract. Our menu consists of three instruments: bank chartering, capital regulation and deposit insurance premium. Bank chartering determines the condition to set up a bank. Deposit insurance premium de…nes the payments paid to the DIC at every time.
Capital regulation is characterized by the regulatory restrictions on dividend distribution, recapitalization plan and liquidation. We …nd that …rst, the insurance premium is a riskbased premium where the risk is measured by the amount of capital. Second, the capital regulation derived from our model shares several similarities with the US PCA. According to our capital regulation, regulatory supervision should be realized in the spirit of gradual intervention and the book-value of capital is used as information to trigger intervention.
Banks with high capital are not subject to any restrictions. Dividend distribution is pro- DeMarzo and Sannikov (2007) . In general, these papers study the long-term …nancial contract in a setting in which a risk neutral entrepreneur seeks funding from risk neutral investors to …nance a project that pays stochastic cash ‡ows over many periods. Their contracting relationship is subject to moral hazard problem which comes either from the unobservability of cash ‡ows or from the hidden e¤orts. The entrepreneur is liable for payments to the investors only to the extent of current revenues. In addition to some variations in modelling, these papers propose di¤erent methods to implement the optimal contract and so, generate di¤erent insights. For example, to get implications for an optimal capital structure, DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) consider to implement the optimal contract by a combination of equity, long-term debt and credit line. Having the same objective but BMPR (2007) study an implementation which is realized via debt, equity and cash reserves. By implementing the optimal contract through the …rm's payout policy, DeMarzo and Sannikov (2007) provides an explanation for the smoothness of corporate dividends relative to earnings and cash ‡ows.
Our paper is also based on a dynamic moral hazard model. However, compared to the above papers, we relax the limited liability of the agent (the banker) and so, allow the principal (the DIC) to require the banker to inject money during their relationship.
Moreover, in this paper, we consider the implementation through a menu of regulatory instruments available in practice of banking regulation. Therefore, we are able to discuss the issue of optimality of PCA-type regulation.
The literature on PCA is mainly empirical. Since the introduction of the US PCA, there have been several attempts to assess its functioning. Some papers recognized signi…cant impacts of PCA in terms of raising capital ratios and reducing risk for banks. Nevertheless, Barth et al. (2004) in a study of bank regulation and supervision in 107 countries raise doubts about government policies that rely excessively on direct government regulation and supervision of banks. For the theoretical analysis of PCA, we can mention Shim The rest of paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we brie ‡y describe the current system of Prompt Corrective Action applied in the US. In section 3, we present the model in a continuous -time setting. Section 4 is devoted to the characterization of the optimal contract. Section 5 shows how this optimal contract is implemented by regulatory instruments. Finally, section 6 concludes. The FDICIA requires each appropriate federal banking agency to take prompt corrective actions to resolve the problems of insured depository institutions at the least possible long -term loss to the deposit insurance fund. To increase the accountability of the regulators in carrying out their delegated responsibilities, the O¢ ce of the Inspector General at the relevant agencies is required to …le audit reports in cases that generate material losses to the deposit insurance fund. These reports review the timeliness and cost e¤ectiveness of corrective actions taken.
As noted by Benston and Kaufman (1997) , the system of predetermined capital/asset ratios that trigger actions by the regulatory authorities serves two purposes. One is to
give banks an incentive to strive for high capital levels. The second purpose is to place limits on the discretion of regulators.
Model
We consider here a repeated relationship between a risk-neutral banker who wants to operate a bank and the risk-neutral Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC) who is in charge of insuring the deposits and supervising the bank.
More speci…cally, at the initial time, the banker has some endowment of cash. If she transfers an amount E 0 to the DIC, she can set up a bank, collects D units of deposits and invests them in a long-term risky loan portfolio. The cumulated cash ‡ows R = 2 Total capital is the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. Tier 1 mainly comprises permanent shareholders' equity, i.e. common stock and disclosed reserves or retained earnings. Tier 2 comprises loan loss reserves, subordinated debts, asset revaluation reserves, hybrid capital instruments, etc. Total risk-based capital ratio is the ratio of total capital to risk-weighted assets.
3 Tier 1 risk-based ratio is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets. 4 Tier 1 leverage ratio is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to total assets. 5 The tangible equity ratio equals the total of Tier 1 capital plus cumulative preferred stock and related surplus less intangibles except qualifying purchased mortgage servicing rights divided by the total of bank assets less intangible assets except qualifying purchased mortgage servicing rights. fR t ; 0 t < 1g of this portfolio evolve according to the following di¤usion process 6
where > 0 and are constants; A t denotes the e¤ort level of the banker at time t and Z A = Z A t ; F t ; 0 t < 1 is a standard Brownian motion de…ned on the measurable space ( ; F) equipped with a probability measure P A induced by the e¤ort process A = fA t ; 0 t < 1g. For simplicity, we assume that the set of feasible e¤ort levels contains two elements f0; 1g : E¤ort is costly for the banker in the sense that she enjoys a private bene…t B if exerting low e¤ort (A t = 0). Denote by v(A t ) the banker's private bene…ts associated with e¤ort level A t . Hence, v(0) = B and v(1) = 0. We assume that B < , i.e., exerting high e¤ort is e¢ cient.
The relationship between the banker and the DIC is subject to a moral hazard problem which comes from the unobservability of the banker's e¤ort. That means, whereas the cash ‡ows process R = fR t ; 0 t < 1g is publicly observable by both the DIC and the banker, the e¤ort level A t is private information of the latter. A contract between the banker and the DIC speci…es, based on the entire history of cash ‡ow realizations, a liquidation time (R s ; 0 s < ) and the payments for the banker at each time before the liquidation time. Denote by C = fC t (R s ; 0 s t) ; 0 t < g the process describing the cumulative payments to the banker. At any time, the bank can also be closed if the banker decides not to run the bank any more and switches to her second-best business which gives her an expected utilityW 2 h 0; 7 where is the discount rate of the banker.
The value of the loan portfolio at the time of termination is assumed to be zero.
We here assume that the DIC possesses an option of requiring the banker to contribute capital into the bank during its operation. The introduction of this option constitutes our major novelty compared to Shim (2006) . The supplementary capital contributed serves to reinforce the bank's balance sheet in order to avoid default. It is interpreted as recapitalization and is modeled in this paper by a negative payment to the banker. Hence, in our paper, at each time t < , the banker can receive a positive, a zero or a negative transfer.
Positive transfer corresponds to some dividend paid to the banker while negative transfer is consistent with a capital injection by the banker. To capture the fact that in general, recapitalization is costly, we assume that the banker has to bear a cost > 0 for each unit of capital contributed. Moreover, we also assume that the amount of capital per unit of time the banker can contribute can not exceed some quantity K, that is dC t Kdt.
This lower bound can be justi…ed by some exogenous borrowing constraint due to the imperfection of capital market.
If the banker discounts the future at the rate and the DIC at the riskless interest rate 8 r < , then, given a contract ( ; C) and an e¤ort strategy A, the total expected 6 In our model, the choice of e¤ort level a¤ects the expected value of the cash ‡ow but not its volatility. Moreover, the e¤ort at time t a¤ects only the distribution of the cash ‡ows at this time. 7 Since E Z 0 e t dt = , ifW > then, for the banker, running a bank is worse than outside options. 8 The assumption that r < means that the DIC is more patient than the banker.
utility for the banker as of time 0, if she never quits, is given by
and for the DIC by
where E A denotes the expectation operator under the probability measure P A .
An e¤ort strategy is de…ned as incentive compatible with respect to the contract ( ; C)
if it maximizes the total expected utility of the banker given ( ; C). Here we focus on the contracts that induce the banker to choose the e¤ort strategy A = fA t = 1 80 t < g (i.e. the banker exerts high e¤ort every time) and if facing these contracts, the banker will never choose to quit. We label such a class of contracts as incentive compatible one. The DIC's problem is to …nd, among this class, the contract which provides him with highest payo¤.
We denote by P the probability measure generated by the e¤ort process A and by E the expectation under P. Then, the DIC's problem can be formulated as follows
subject to the following constraints
The formulation of the constraint (3) 
Optimal contract
In this section, we present the derivation of the optimal contract. Based on the techniques introduced by Sannikov (2008) , we know that instead of contingent the optimal contract on the whole history of the loan's cash ‡ows, we can use the banker's continuation utility as state variable and write the contract as function of this variable. Therefore, the characterization of the optimal contract will proceed in three steps. First, we state a result that relates the incentive compatibility condition of the e¤ort process A to the dynamic evolution of the banker's continuation utility. Next, we prove that the DIC's payo¤ function can be determined as solution to some ordinary di¤erential equations. Finally, by solving this equation, we …nd the optimal contract.
Incentive compatibility condition
Here, we derive the incentive compatibility constraint for the banker. Given a contract ( ; C), for each t < , denote by W A t the banker's continuation utility corresponding to an e¤ort strategy A = fA t ; 0 t < g. It is the total expected utility the banker derives from the transfers paid to her from time t on if she follows the strategy A.
The following lemma provides a useful representation of W A t Lemma 1 There exists a stochastic process G A = G A t ; 0 t < 1 that represents the sensitivity of the banker's continuation utility to the cash ‡ows, i.e.
Proof. De…ne by V A t the banker's lifetime utility corresponding to the contract ( ; C) and to the e¤ort stratety A = fA t ; 0 t < g conditionally on the information available at time t < , then
So, we can rewrite V A t as follows
On the other hand, by construction, we have that V A t is F t measurable and that for all s t < ,
By the martingale representation theorem, there exists a progressively measurable stochastic process G A = G A t ; F t ; 0 t < 1 de…ned on the probability space ; F; P A and satisfying
for all 0 t < 1 such that
therefore,
(6) is automatically derived from (7) and (9). Q.E.D.
The lemma 1 provides a representation of the banker's continuation utility as an Ito process. This representation is valid for any e¤ort strategy A. The question arised now is
to determine under what conditions the banker will optimally choose to follow the e¤ort strategy A .
Let W t and Z t be correspondently de…ned for the e¤ort process A . Applying the lemma 1 to this e¤ort process, we have
where G = fG t ; F t ; 0 t < 1g is de…ned on the probability space ( ; F; P). Obviously, at each time t, to decide what level of e¤ort should be taken, the banker will rely on how this decision a¤ects her continuation utility. Exerting high e¤ort at time t (A t = 1) immediately causes a loss of private bene…t B to the banker but it improves her continuation value in expected term by Gt . Hence, intuitively, choosing high e¤ort is pro…table to the banker as long as Proof. See appendix A.
The proposition 1 means that for the incentive provision purpose, the banker has to bear some minimum risk, which is materialized by requiring that her continuation utility must be sensitive enough to the cash ‡ows.
DIC' s continuation payo¤ function
The incentive compatibility condition being de…ned, it is the time for characterizing the DIC's payo¤ function. Denote it by F (W t ) 9 . It stands for the maximal continuation payo¤ the DIC can earn from all incentive compatible contracts when a continuation utility W t is promised to the banker at time t.
Consider an in…nitesimal time interval [t; t + dt), given a promised utility W t for the banker, if a transfer dC t is paid to her during this period, the DIC immediately receives dR t dC t and his continuation payo¤ is equal to F (W t + dW t ). In other words, given the payment dC t to the banker, the actual change in the DIC's payo¤ is measured by the sum of dR t dC t and F (W t + dW t ) F (W t ). Since the DIC discounts the future at the rate r, the expected change of his payo¤ during the considered time interval is represented by the term rF (W t )dt. Therefore, intuitively, the DIC's payo¤ function is solution to the following equation:
equivalently,
On the left-hand side of (12) In what follows, we will assume that the function F (:) is concave, which will be checked later. We …rst determine the condition under which a positive transfer should be paid to the banker. To provide the banker with the utility W t , the DIC has the option to pay a lump-sum transfer of dC t > 0 and switching to the contract with promised utility W t dC t . The DIC's payo¤ corresponding to this compensation structure is equal to F (W t dC t ) dC t : So, giving a positive compensation to the banker is optimal for the DIC if and only if
In other words, paying a positive transfer is optimal over the range of W t where the function F (W t ) + W t is nonincreasing. De…ne W by
Owing to the concavity of the function F , we obtain dC t > 0 if and only if W t > W Now, we turn to the circumstance under which the banker will be required to inject capital into the bank. Similarly with dividend threshold, to be able to …nd recapitalization threshold, we should compare the DIC's payo¤ between di¤erent payment structures.
Given the utility W t promised to the banker, if the DIC requires the banker to contributes dC t > 0, because of the cost of capital contribution, he has to move to the contract with promised utility W t (1 + )dC t and gets a payo¤ F (W t (1 + )dC t ) dC t . Therefore, demanding a recapitalization is optimal if and only if
Thus, a recapitalization should happen over the range of W t where the function
Since the function F is concave, it is obvious that W is less than W .
In summary, the banker collects a positive compensation once W t > W . When W t is in between W and W , no transfer between the DIC and the banker occurs. Finally, if W t falls below W , the banker must inject capital into the bank. Since the banker has the possibility to quit and take outside option with reservation utilityW , on the equilibrium path, W t can not fall belowW and the DIC must close the bank once W t reaches this boundary value, which implies F (W ) = 0.
Hence, over the interval W ; W , the dynamic evolution of the banker's continuation utility W t becomes:
Using Ito's formula to compute dF (W t ), we see from (12) that over W ; W , the DIC's payo¤ function has to satisfy the following condition:
Since the function F (:) is concave, it is optimal to set G t at its minimal possible value B , which indicates that over W ; W , the DIC's payo¤ function is solution to
Regarding the case where W t belongs to the interval W ; W i , we know that the bank should be recapitalized. We assume that in this case, payments to the banker are absolutely continuous with respect to time, that is dC t = c t dt where c t 2 [ K; 0), then, the banker's continuation utility evolves according to
Again, applying Ito's formula, we obtain:
Since the function F (:) is concave and F 0 (W ) 
The following proposition characterizes the optimal contract Proposition 2 The optimal contract is characterized through the continuation utility W of the banker whose dynamic evolution is governed by the following stochastic di¤ erential
The DIC's payo¤ function F is determined as follows
where F 1 and F 2 are speci…ed by
with six boundary conditions: We found that recapitalization threshold is decreasing with while dividend threshold is increasing with it. Thus, when recapitalization cost is higher, not only the recapitalization region is reduced but also, for prudent reason, it takes more time for the bank to start distributing dividend. Two limiting cases concerning recapitalization cost are worth mentioning. When = 0, we see that F 0 2 ( W ) = 1 = F 0 2 (W ), which means that two thresholds W and W coincide. The intuition is that since recapitalization is costless, it is optimal for the DIC to use this punishment device as soon as possible. For the other case, when ! +1, relying on the value of the function F 1 at the pointW , we obtain
no recapitalization is
involved in the optimal contract. This result is also intuitive.
Corollary 1
In two limiting cases concerning the recapitalization cost, the optimal contract exhibits following properties
Determination of initial rent for the banker
Proposition 2 describes the optimal contract for a given initial promised utility W 0 for the banker. We now study how this value is determined. In the context of banking regulation, it is reasonable to think of the situation where the DIC has the right to charter a banker from a competitive pool. Hence, the DIC retains all bargaining power. The initial rent for the banker is determined by
5 Implementation of the optimal contract
Implementation results
So far, we characterized the optimal contract that induces the banker to exert high e¤ort every time. Now, we consider to implement this optimal contract through a regulatory menu which is designed by the DIC and informed to all potential bankers from the initial time. The DIC acting as a supervisory authority commits to pursue it. Our regulatory menu consists of three tools: bank chartering, capital regulation and deposit insurance premium. Deposit insurance premium. It is characterized by a sequence of payment dP t from the banker to the DIC during each time interval [t; t + dt) 10 .
Capital regulation. It determines the rules regarding distribution of dividends, recapitalization and liquidation policy.
Note that all provisions of the regulatory menu will be made contingent on the amount of capital E t of the bank. In other words, in our implementation, the level of bank's capital plays the role of a record-keeping device, as W t does in the abstract characterization of optimal contract. For implementation purpose, we de…ne two thresholds E , E which respectively correspond to W W , W W .
Proposition 3
The following regulatory menu will implement the optimal contract In order to get a licence of opening a bank, the banker must contribute an amount of capital E 0 = W 0 W . During each in…nitesimal time interval [t; t + dt), the banker has to pay to the DIC
The bank is prevented to distribute dividends as long as the amount of capital is not greater than E . When its level of capital is larger than this threshold, all excess capital is distributed as dividends. The DIC orders a recapitalization from the bank if its capital level falls below E. The bank is placed into the liquidation procedure if its amount of capital is zero.
Proof. See appendix C
In the above implementation, the bank's capital level E t at each time t before the liquidation time is related to the banker's continuation utility W t by the functional relationship E t = W t W for all t. The initial amount of cash is …nanced by equity which is capital contributed by the banker. To ensure the voluntary participation of the banker, E 0 could not exceed W 0 W . Since we assume that the DIC charters a banker from a competitive pool, it is optimal for the former to set E 0 = W 0 W . This prescription regarding the minimum starting capital level for opening a bank is present in law of a number of countries.
The periodic payment to the DIC (i.e. the deposit insurance premium) is determined to coordinate the evolution of the bank's capital level with the motion of the banker's continuation utility characterized in the proposition 2. We observe that this insurance premium is decreasing with the amount of bank's capital at each time. Hence, our insurance premium can be interpreted as risk -based premium where the risk is measured by bank's capital level 11 .
Relatively to the capital regulation, we see that the regulation system derived in our model and the US PCA have several similarities. Indeed, our regulation system speci…es that restrictions on banks become more stringent the less capitalized banks are. According to our regulation, banks can be classi…ed in four categories based on their capital level.
Banks with high level of capital (more than E ) would be subject to minimum prudential intervention, they can distribute dividends to shareholders. In banks with intermediate capital level (i.e. their capital level falls into the interval E; E ), dividend distributions are suspended but banks are still allowed to continue in normal operation, no capital restoration is required. If the bank's capital level still falls lower, the regulator will order banks to recapitalise promptly and in the worst situation, the bank's authorities resolve banks through liquidation. A remark is that when the bank has to proceed a recapitalization, the DIC will reduce the premium by K which exactly corresponds to the total cost of recapitalization. This premium reduction can be seen as a subsidy from the DIC to the undercapitalized banks in replenishing capital.
Discussion
Banking supervisors'discretion: A key component of any regulatory arrangement is the nature, timing and form of intervention. The novelty of the US PCA is that it recommends a reduction of supervisory discretion by requiring the supervisors to take some prespeci…ed intervention actions at some predetermined thresholds of banks'capital. Our approach to design the banking regulation is to implement the ex-ante optimal contract without the possibility of renegotiation. Therefore, as is done in the US PCA, in our model-implied capital regulation, all actions of the regulator is speci…ed ex-ante by the law, which means that the regulators' discretion is limited. Another aspect introduced in the US PCA in favor of limiting regulatory forbearance is the provisions calling for timely resolution.
According to these provisions, banks should be closed before the economic value of their capital becomes negative. Our liquidation policy exhibits the same property in the sense that it claims to liquidate the banks as soon as their capital is wiped out. Insolvent banks with negative capital should not be allowed to continue in operation.
Book -value vs. Market -value: One of the major issues about the e¤ectiveness of the US PCA is related to its intervention triggering device. The triggers for prompt corrective actions in FDICIA are based on historical -cost accounting measures (i.e. on the book-value of capital), which raises the concerns about the adequacy of such indicators.
Some studies (e.g. Peek and Rosengren (1996, 1997) and Jones and King (1992, 1995)) have noted that the capital ratio thresholds used in PCA are lagging indicators of a bank's …nancial status. In our proposed regulation system, the regulatory restrictions are contingent on the book-value of capital. However, this result should not be seen as a support for the use of book -value against the use of market -value measure. Indeed, what matters for the discrepancy between book -value and market -value is possible changes in the interest rates and default probability of loans compared to the initial situations when liabilities and assets are acquired 12 . In our model, both variables (r and ) are assumed to be …xed over time. So, there is no interest to distinguish these two measures. A rigorous analyse of the choice between two measures requires a richer setting than ours.
Conclusion
In this paper, we apply the approach of designing prudential regulation of banks as a mechanism to implement the socially optimal allocation proposed by Shim (2006) to study the optimality of the current US Prompt Corrective Action. In a dynamic setting where the regulator (the DIC) can not observe the e¤ort chosen by the banker and can require the banker to inject capital during the operation of bank, we …rst derive the optimal contract specifying the payments to the banker and the liquidation policy, using the banker's expected discounted utility as sate variable. Then, we show that this contract can be implemented by a combination of capital regulation and risk-based deposit insurance premium. From the implementation results, we observe that the PCA version applied in the US closely mimics properties of an optimal regulation.
A Appendix: Proof of proposition 1
De…ne by V t the total utility the banker expects to get from the contract ( ; C) if she chooses the e¤ort strategy A conditionally on the information available at time t <
and byṼ t the one the banker receives if she follows an e¤ort strategy A up to time t < and then, switches to the strategy A
Similarly to (8), we can represent
Hence, the dynamic evolution ofṼ t under the probability measure P is the following
Since Z t and Z A t are related by the equality dZ t = dZ A t + 1 ( A t ) dt, under the probability measure P A ,Ṽ t evolves according to
Conclusion 1 IfṼ t is P A submartingale, then the e¤ ort strategy A is suboptimal for the banker
Proof. Indeed, the fact thatṼ t is P A submartingale means for all s t,
Therefore, for all t 0,
Note that E A Ṽ t represents the total utility the banker expects to get at date 0 if she follows a strategy A until the time t and then, follows the strategy A . Obviously, (13) implies that the strategy A is suboptimal compared to A.
Conclusion 2 IfṼ t is P A supermartingale, then the e¤ ort strategy A is at least as good as the strategy A for the banker Proof. SinceṼ t is P A supermartingale, we have
for all s t. Applying the optional sampling theorem, we get
E A Ṽ accounts for the total utility the banker expects to get at date 0 if she always follows the strategy A and so, (14) concludes the proof.
From two conclusions above, we obtain the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the optimality of the strategy A . That is, the drift coe¢ cient ofṼ t under P A is non positive:
It is equivalent to G t B . Q.E.D
B Appendix: Proof of proposition 2
For the formal proof, we have to establish the following conclusions:
1) the contract characterized in this proposition is incentive compatible
2) It is optimal among the class of incentive compatible contracts
Because of the proposition 1, the incentive compatibility of the characterized contract is derived directly from the speci…cation of the dynamic evolution of banker's continuation utility. The proof for the optimality proceeds as follows:
B.1 Upper bound of the DIC' s expected payo¤
Here, we will prove that the function F -solution, if exists, to the equation (12) with boundary condition F (W ) = 0 constitutes an upper bound for the expected payo¤ the DIC can earn from any incentive compatible contract that delivers the banker an initial expected discounted utility W 0 .
Consider any incentive compatible contract ( ; C), the expected payo¤ of the DIC is evaluated by
De…ne a stochastic process M = fM t g by
where W t is de…ned by (10) with G t B . We have
which implies
Since F (W t ) is solution to (12) , the drift coe¢ cient of the dynamic evolution of M t is negative, which indicates that M = fM t g is supermartingale. Therefore,
In (16), the …rst equality stems from F (W ) = F (W ) = 0; the inequality is due to the optional sampling theorem.
B.2 DIC' s expected payo¤ from the optimal contract
Now, we show that the contract characterized in this proposition provide the DIC with expected payo¤ exactly equal to F (W 0 ). Notice that if the process M = fM t g is martingale, then
Therefore, we should prove that under the contract characterized in the proposition 2, the process M = fM t g de…ned by (15) It is easy to see that r + W constitutes a particular solution to (17) . Assuming that P 0 (W ) and P 1 (W ) are two particular solutions of the homogeneous di¤erential equation (18) such that P 0 ( W ) = 0; P 0 0 ( W ) = 1 and P 1 ( W ) = 1; P 0 1 ( W ) = 0. Since the Wronskian L P 0 P 1 (W ) associated with P 0 (W ) and P 1 (W ) has non-zero value at the point W , the two function P 0 (W ) and P 1 (W ) are linearly independent. Therefore, general solution to the equation (17) will be written as
Based on two conditions S 0 2 ( W ) = 1+ and S 0 2 (W ) = 0 with some value W , we obtain
Thus, the general solution to the equation (17) becomes
Because of (17), we get
, the equality (19) becomes
Now we will prove that the function (W ) is strictly decreasing and concave. Indeed, from the following expression of the Wronskian:
! obtained by applying the Abel's identity, we get 13
Therefore, showing that the function (W ) is strictly decreasing and concave is equivalent to prove that P 0 1 (W ) < 0 for all W > W . Assuming by contradiction that there exists
which implies that P 1 ( • W ) < P 1 ( W ) = 1 < 0. Since the function P 1 (W ) satis…es which is exactly the equality (24).
Owing to the above result, we can easily show that 
